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EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
JAMES THUO GATHII* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This article analyzes the resort to the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) 
by human rights advocates and business actors. In doing so, this article 
considers how the EACJ fits Alter, Helfer, and Madsen’s concept of the 
authority of an international court (IC). According to Alter and her co-authors, 
an IC has authority when two conditions are met. First, when a legally binding 
ruling issued by an IC exists, and second, when key audiences, such as 
governments and private actors, engage in meaningful practices designed to 
give full effect to those rulings. This article demonstrates that the EACJ has 
intermediate authority at a thin-elite level in human rights cases because urban-
based, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), pro-democracy 
activists, and some governmental officials recognize in some, but not all, cases 
the legally binding nature of the EACJ’s human rights cases and take steps to 
give effect to the rulings of the EACJ. Most importantly, the EACJ has 
intermediate authority not only because there are efforts by governments to 
comply with some human rights cases, as the Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 
authority framework suggests, but also because of the mobilization of these 
cases to “name and shame” East African Community (EAC) governments for 
human rights violations, which that framework does not take into account. 
Human rights advocates have actively and repeatedly litigated their cases in 
the EACJ, even though the EACJ does not have explicit jurisdiction to decide 
human rights cases. In fact, in every case raising a human rights issue that has 
come before the EACJ, the defending government has challenged the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but it has continued to litigate before the Court when its 
jurisdictional challenge has failed. Further, the judges of the EACJ have been 
proactive in encouraging human rights cases to come before the Court. 
Unlike human rights advocates, business actors in general and the East 
African Business Council (EABC) in particular have eschewed litigating before 
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the EACJ. Yet, nontariff barriers (NTBs) impose very high costs for business in 
the EAC. Rather than pursue litigation, over the last ten years the EABC has 
pursued an administrative strategy embodied in the NTB Monitoring 
Mechanism for monitoring, reporting, and removing NTBs. This mechanism 
gives the EABC access to the EAC’s Council of Ministers and Secretariat as 
well as EAC member states. 
This article illustrates the variation between human rights and business 
actors in their use of the EACJ. Part II introduces the EACJ. Part III discusses 
the EABC’s NTB Mechanism. Part IV includes an examination of the reasons 
accounting for the absence of litigation arising from private sector actors in the 
EACJ. Part V examines the EACJ’s human rights case law with a view to 
establishing the contrast between the Court’s human rights cases and the 
nonexistence of trade cases. Part VI concludes by reflecting on the implications 
of this variation for the three-tiered framework of the authority of international 
courts. The conclusion also shows that this framework’s compliance-centric 
account of authority minimizes the other goals served by human rights litigation 
before the EACJ. 
II 
THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The EACJ was inaugurated in 2001 following its establishment as the 
judicial organ of the EAC.1 It was not until 2005, however, that the EACJ 
received its first case. Since then, the EACJ has decided about sixty cases. In 
the period between 2001 and 2005, the judges of the EACJ engaged in outreach 
activities to the then-burgeoning regional bar association and its affiliate 
national chapters, to NGOs, and to donors who sponsored training programs in 
Europe and elsewhere.2 These external constituencies in turn became major 
sources for cases filed before the Court. As allies to the EACJ, they also 
defended the Court when it decided cases that EAC member states criticized. 
In its original structure, the Court had one chamber.3 However, amendments 
to the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC (EAC Establishment Treaty) 
that came into effect in March 2007 created an Appellate Division, making the 
Court a two-chamber court.4 The First Division is comprised of ten judges,5 two 
 
 1.  The East African Community (EAC) was reestablished in 1999. See JAMES THUO GATHII, 
AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 181 (2011). The original EAC was 
disbanded in 1977 following major differences among the three original members: Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania. See id. at 43 (discussing Kenya’s dissatisfaction as a primary factor leading to dissolution); id. 
at 181 (stating the original members of EAC were Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda); id. at 268.  
 2.  James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s 
Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 272 (2014).  
 3.    EACJ, User Guide, at 11 (2014), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/User-Guide.pdf. 
 4.  Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, art. 24, Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 
U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter EAC Establishment Treaty]. The EAC Establishment Treaty provides that 
the Court “shall consist of a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division.”  Id. art. 23(2). These 
amendments were made following a decision of the EACJ that was strongly objected to by the 
government of Kenya. For more on the circumstances leading to the amendments, see Gathii, supra 
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from each of the five EAC member states.6 The Appellate Division is 
comprised of five judges,7 one from each of the five member states.8 The current 
location of the Court is Arusha, Tanzania. This location is deemed to be 
temporary; a permanent seat for the Court has not yet been determined by the 
Summit,9 the highest organ in the EAC.10 The Summit also appoints judges to 
the Court.11 Other than the President of the Court, who also heads the 
Appellate Division, and the Principal Judge of the First Instance Division,12 the 
judges do not reside in Arusha.13 They come to Arusha when there is a 
prescheduled convening of court business.14 Judges hold office for a seven-year 
period15 and must retire at seventy years of age.16 As further evidence of the 
novelty of this Court, the salaries, conditions of service, and other terms of 
EACJ judges are yet to be determined.17 
The EACJ has jurisdiction “over the interpretation and application” of the 
EAC Establishment Treaty.18 The EAC Establishment Treaty then provides 
 
note 2, at 268–71. 
 5.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 24(2) (providing that the First Instance Division 
shall not be comprised of more than ten judges). 
 6.  Id. art. 24(1)(a) (providing that no more than two judges can be appointed from the same 
EAC partner state). 
 7.  Id. art. 24(2) (providing that the Appellate Division shall not be comprised of more than five 
judges). 
 8.  Id. art. 24(1)(b). 
 9.  Id. art. 47 (providing that the “[s]eat of the Court shall be determined by the Summit”). 
 10.  Id. art. 10 (stating that the Summit comprises the heads of government of the five East African 
partner states). 
 11.  Id. art. 24 
 12.  Under the EAC Establishment Treaty, the President “shall direct the work of the Court, 
represent it, regulate the disposition of matters before the Court, and preside over its sessions.” Id. art. 
24(10). Under Article 24(8), the “Principal Judge shall direct the work of the First Instance Division, 
represent it, regulate the disposition of the matters brought before the Court and preside over its 
sessions.” Id. art. 24(8). The EAC Establishment Treaty provides that “[t]he President and Vice-
President . . . shall not be nationals of the same Partner State.” Id. art. 24(6). 
 13.  EAC, EACJ Judge President, Principal Judge Now Full-Time in Arusha (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1044:eacj-judge-president-
principal-judge-now-full-time-in-arusha&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194.  
 14.  Since 2013, both divisions of the Court have held longer quarterly sessions every year as the 
number of cases has increased. For example, the First Division continued to meet between February 4 
and February 28. See EACJ, EACJ 5th Quarter Sessions Resume Today (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://eacj.org/?p=1756. 
 15.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 25(1). 
 16.  Id. art. 25(2). As a matter of practice, judicial appointments are staggered to prevent all the 
judges’ terms coming to an end at the same time. In the first appointment round, judges are appointed 
for seven years. In the second appointment round, judges are appointed for five years. The cycle is then 
repeated with each subsequent appointment round. Interview with Justice Butasi, Principal Judge of 
the EACJ First Division, in Arusha, Tanzania (June 25, 2014). 
 17.  See EACJ, Strategic Plan: 2010–2015, at v (Apr. 2010). The EAC Establishment Treaty 
provides that the Summit, which  consists of the heads of government of EAC states, shall determine 
the salary, terms, and conditions upon recommendation of the EAC Council of Ministers. EAC 
Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 25(5). 
 18.  Id. art. 27(1). In addition, the EAC Establishment Treaty provides that the role of the Court 
shall be to “ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with 
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that the EACJ “shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and 
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent 
date.”19 At the 15th Ordinary Summit of the EAC’s Heads of State, a decision 
was made to defer giving the EACJ jurisdiction over human rights and to 
instead consult with the African Union on the matter.20 The Summit did, 
however, extend the Court’s jurisdiction over trade and investment cases as well 
as cases arising under the EAC’s Monetary Union treaty.21 The Court also has 
jurisdiction over disputes between the EAC and its employees;22 arbitral 
disputes arising from commercial contracts between private parties; and 
agreements to which the EAC, any of its institutions, or EAC member states 
are parties if an arbitration clause in such a contract or agreement confers such 
jurisdiction.23 
Any person residing in the EAC can bring cases to the EACJ.24 Such suit 
can only be filed against one of the EAC member states or an institution of the 
EAC for a declaration that its conduct is inconsistent with the EAC 
Establishment Treaty.25 Employees of the EAC may sue regarding the terms 
and conditions of their service to the EAC.26 The Court’s arbitral jurisdiction 
can be invoked pursuant to an agreement or contract between commercial 
actors, the EAC, or EAC member states.27 
Having introduced the Court, the next part of this article examines the NTB 
mechanism that business actors in East Africa have preferred to litigation for 
resolving complaints about trade barriers. 
 
this Treaty.” Id. art. 23(1). 
 19.  Id. art. 27(2) (emphasis added). 
 20.  See EAC, Communiqué of the 15th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State, ¶ 16 (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1437:communique-15th-
ordinary-summit-of-the-eac-heads-of-state-&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194 (extending the 
jurisdiction of the EACJ to include commercial, investment and monetary matters, but deciding to 
work with the African Union (rather than the EACJ) on matters relating to human rights and crimes 
against humanity). 
 21.  EAC, Communiqué of the 16th Ordinary Summit of the East African Community Heads of 
State, ¶ 9, http://news.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=410&Item 
id=; EAC, EACJ Gets New Judges and Deputy Principal Judge (Jan. 27, 2015), http://eacj.org/?p=1754  
(noting that “[t]he Summit approved the Council recommendation to extend the jurisdiction of the 
[EACJ] to cover trade and investment as well as matters associated with the East African Monetary 
Union. On Human Rights matters as well as crimes against humanity, the Summit directed the Council 
of Ministers to work with the African Union on this matter.”).  
 22.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 31. 
 23.  Id. art. 32. 
 24.  Id. art. 30(1). 
 25.  Id. art. 30 (providing that in such a case the Court could be asked to determine “the legality of 
any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner State or an institution of the EAC on 
grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the 
provisions of this Treaty”). A carve-out in Article 30(3) provides that the Court shall have no 
jurisdiction “where an Act, regulation, directive, decision or action has been reserved under this Treaty 
to an institution of a Partner State.” Id. art. 30(3).  
 26.  Id. art. 31. 
 27.  Id. art. 32. 
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III 
THE NONTARIFF BARRIER MECHANISM OF THE EABC 
Businesses or individuals challenging conduct related to the business 
environment in East Africa filed only four of the sixty or so cases decided by 
the EACJ between December 2005 and June 2013.28 This is surprising given that 
trade integration is a primary goal of the EAC. Three of the four major stages 
of the EAC’s regional integration involve trade—the customs, common market, 
and monetary union stages. Only the final stage, political union, is not primarily 
business related. 
  As part IV demonstrates, only four of the cases that have come before 
the EACJ relate to governmental conduct with respect to the business 
environment and, surprisingly, none of the cases involve regional trade 
integration rules.29 Why have businesses in the EAC not used the EACJ to 
resolve business problems that stand in the way of EAC integration? The 
absence of business disputes in the EACJ is striking considering that NTBs are 
widely recognized as one of the most important impediments to trade 
integration in East Africa.30 These barriers include burdensome and costly 
customs procedures, import licensing procedures and charges, costly road-user 
charges, and sanitary and phytosanitary barriers.31 The Secretary General of the 
EAC acknowledges that NTBs are the biggest limitation on market access 
facing East African companies,32 yet there is not even a trickle of cases 
challenging these barriers in the EACJ. The EAC’s customs and common 
market protocols—as well as the EAC’s Establishment Treaty—prohibit 
NTBs.33 
 
 28.  A peculiar feature of the EACJ’s case law is that each individual case spawns several 
interlocutory applications involving issues such as jurisdiction challenges or questions relating to 
whether or not interim orders such as injunctions would be issued. Hence, although only fifty-six cases 
were filed before the EACJ between December 2005 and June 2013, they involved 109 separate 
decisions. 
 29.  See infra Part IV. 
 30.  EAC, The Second EAC Development Strategy 2001–2005, at 12 (Apr. 24, 2001), http://www. 
eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=3&Itemid=163 (identifying nontariff 
barriers such as administrative and bureaucratic inefficiencies standards and technical requirements as 
major impediments to trade in East Africa). The report further noted nontariff barriers could be more 
significant than tariffs as barriers to trade in East Africa. Id. 
 31.  Article 1 (Interpretation) of the EAC Establishment Treaty defines nontariff barriers as 
“administrative and technical requirements imposed by a partner state in the movement of goods.” 
EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1. The EAC Customs Union Protocol defines nontariff 
barriers as “laws, regulations, administrative and technical requirements other than tariffs imposed by a 
Partner State whose effect is to impede trade.” EAC, Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Customs Union, at pt. A, art. 1 (Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Customs Union Protocol].  
 32.  Richard Sezibera, Let’s Rid EAC of These Non Tariff Barriers, EAC OFFICE OF SECRETARY 
GENERAL, http://www.eac.int/sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:lets-rid-eac-of-
these-ntbs&catid=40:sgs-blog&Itemid=1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).  
 33.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 75 (providing that “the Partner States agree to 
remove all the existing non-tariff barriers on the importation into their territory of goods originating 
from the other Partner States and thereafter refrain from imposing further nontariff barriers”); EAC, 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, art. (2)(a) (Nov. 20, 
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Established in 1997, the EABC represents the interests of the private sector 
in EAC integration processes.34 It comprises national private-sector associations 
representing manufacturers, industry groups (such as banks), and chambers of 
commerce.35 It aims at creating an enabling and conducive business 
environment for its members by lobbying for targeted policy reforms at the 
EAC.36 It engages directly with national policymakers. At the EAC Secretariat, 
the EABC enjoys “observer status,” which allows it to participate in all 
activities of any organ or institution of the EAC.37 This unprecedented access to 
the EAC gives the EABC a seat at the table in the drafting of EAC policies and 
treaties, as well as other EAC activities.38 The EABC is therefore able to 
channel its goals to the highest decisionmaking body of the EAC, the Summit, 
which consists of the heads of government of the five member states.39 
An example of the EABC’s success in lobbying within the EAC was a 
decision by its Ministerial Council, the highest policy-making organ, to give the 
EABC, a private organization, acquiescence to draft together with the EAC 
Secretariat a monitoring mechanism to identify, monitor, and remove nontrade 
barriers in the EAC.40 This delegation of authority to draft this monitoring 
mechanism is remarkable considering Article 13(2) of the Customs Union 
Protocol of 2004 gives that power to EAC member states.41 Interviews with 
EAC and EABC officials confirmed that the EABC was integrally involved in 
the drafting of the Customs Union Protocol.42 In fact, according to an EABC 
official, EAC integration was no longer a government-to-government affair, but 
rather one in which the private sector was an integral part.43 As a reflection of 
 
2009) [hereinafter Common Market Protocol] (providing that partner states will eliminate NTBs to 
trade); Customs Union Protocol, supra note 31, art. 13(1) (providing that that “each of the Partner 
States agrees to remove, with immediate effect, all the existing non-tariff barriers to the importation 
into their respective territories of goods originating in the other Partner States and, thereafter, not to 
impose any new nontariff barriers”). In addition, the EAC Establishment Treaty provides that EAC 
member states will establish a customs union and will include commitments to eliminate nontariff 
barriers. EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 75(1)(c).  
 34.  EABC, Who We Are, http://www.eabc.info/eabc/about/category/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 
25, 2015).  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Interview with Human Rights Advocate M, in Nairobi, Kenya (Sept. 5, 2013) (noting that 
business groups were the first to obtain observer status in the EAC and that it is not easy for human 
rights groups to get observer status in the EAC because to obtain such a status, a group must have a 
chapter in each of the give member states, and highlighting the difficulty of human rights groups to 
meet that criteria due to the expense of having five national offices). Notably, the EABC does not have 
offices in each of the five member states. Instead, it works with nationally based associations. 
 39.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 10(1).   
 40.  See East African Community, East African Community Gazette, Vol. AT 1—No. 004, 2 (Dec. 
30, 2007) (showing both that the Council of Minsters commended the EAC Secretariat in collaboration 
with the EABC for developing guidelines on removal of NTBs and also that the Council adopted 
Mechanism on Monitoring NTBs).  
 41.  Customs Union Protocol, supra note 31, art. 13(2). 
 42.  Interview with EABC official, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013). 
 43.  Id. (noting that the success of the current efforts at EAC integration, unlike in the past, was on 
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the central involvement of the private sector in EAC integration initiatives, the 
NTB mechanism was designed in a process that involved key policymakers and 
heads of agencies responsible for enforcing trade-related requirements, on the 
one hand, and business associations and representatives of key businesses in the 
EAC, on the other.44 
These negotiations coincided with the coming into force of the Customs 
Market Protocol in 2005.45 Soon thereafter, the EABC forwarded the study to 
the EAC Council of Ministers, which adopted it in 2006.46 That same year, the 
EABC compiled the first inventory of NTBs in East Africa.47 Under the 
mechanism, each member state has established a National Monitoring 
Committee (NMC), which meets annually and report to the Regional Forum on 
NTBs, which in turn meets quarterly.48 In 2013, the twelfth Regional NTB 
Forum meeting was held.49 In each EAC member country, there is both a 
public- and private-sector focal point designed to work together toward the 
elimination of NTBs.50 
The EABC’s strategy for removal of NTBs is a legally nonbinding 
administrative mechanism. It establishes a coordination framework within 
which national institutions and officials in a variety of government departments 
 
account of the involvement of the private sector). 
 44.  EAC, EABC & Simon Ngatia Ihigaa, Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff 
Barriers in EAC, at 3 [hereinafter Monitoring Mechanism]. 
 45.  See Customs Union Protocol, supra note 31, art. 43 (stating the protocol will become effective 
“upon ratification and deposit of instruments of ratification with the Secretary General by all the 
Partner States”). 
 46.  Nick Kimani, Overcoming Non-Tariff Barriers to Regional Trade Through Stakeholder 
Forums: Normative and Empirical Dimensions, 4, AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (Oct. 28–30, 
2013), http://www.afdb.org/en/aec-2013/papers/paper/overcoming-non-tariff-barriers-to-regional-trade-
through-stakeholder-forums-normative-and-empirical-dimensions-902/.  
 47.  EABC, Non-Tariff Barriers, http://www.eabc.info/policy/non-tariff-barriers-ntbs (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2015). 
 48.  See Monitoring Mechanism, supra note 44, at 18 (on annual meetings of NMCs). Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda established National Committees in 2007 and Burundi and Rwanda in 2008. 
Capacity-building workshops were conducted. For a typical meeting where NMCs report to the 
Regional Forum, see EAC, Report of the 16th EAC Regional Forum on Non-Tariff Barriers (Dec. 9–11, 
2014), http://www.meac.go.tz/sites/default/files/Documents/NTB%20REPORT%20DEC%202014.pdf. 
 49.  Outcome of the 12th EAC Regional Forum on NTBs, RWANDA NATIONAL MONITORING 
COMMITTEE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://nmcrwanda.org/spip.php?article141.  
 50.  Kimani, supra note 46, at 5.  Since 2012, the EAC Secretary General has held annual forums 
for the private sector and civil society groups to engage with the work of the EAC. See EAC 
Secretariat, Entebbe to Host 3rd EAC Secretary General’s Forum for Private Sector and Civil Society in 
September 2014, (Mar. 6, 2014) http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_content&view=article 
&id=1165:entebbe-to-hhost-3rd-eac-secretary-generals-forum-for-private-sector-and-civil-society-in-
september-2014&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid=69; see also EAC News Agency, Uganda to Host 
Secretary General’s Third Forum, IPPNEWS MEDIA (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.ippmedia.com 
/frontend/?l=65577 (“The Dialogue Framework Forum for Private Sector, Civil Society and other 
interest groups in the EAC integration process was endorsed by the EAC Council of Ministers at its 
26th meeting in November 2012 in Nairobi, Kenya. The Forum is guided by the principles of 
cooperation for mutual benefit, trust, goodwill, active and constructive participation, inclusivity and 
respect for diverse views.”).  
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responsible for facilitating intra-EAC trade51 assume responsibilities for 
overseeing NTB elimination.52 The EABC, its members, and the responsible 
organs of the EAC monitor and report to the EAC Council of Ministers on the 
progress made in the removal of NTBs. The NTB mechanism is therefore a 
forum for communication and dialogue to eliminate NTBs. It is a cooperative 
solution designed to provide a common pool of information and knowledge 
about NTBs among an otherwise disparate set of national and regional actors 
needed to remove NTBs.53 
A World Bank study showed that, between 2008 and 2009, the Kenya 
Private Sector Alliance had successfully negotiated the removal of roadblocks 
with the Prime Minister’s Round Table talks.54 In early 2013, the EABC 
realized some NTBs that had been successfully removed had begun to reappear 
under a different guise. Hence, the EABC sought further dialogue with the 
EAC to enact a legally binding and time-bound framework for their removal.55 
This move toward a legally binding framework evidences a private-sector-led 
increase in reliance on legal mechanisms in the removal of trade barriers in East 
Africa. 
The next part of this article explains why the EABC has opted for a 
monitoring mechanism for which implementation depends on the “goodwill and 
commitment” of EAC member states, rather than opted for a litigation strategy 
that would result in a legally binding decision of the EACJ. 
 
 51.  These include customs and immigration officials, standard-setting agencies such as bureaus of 
standards, plant and health inspectorates, revenue agencies, and trade and industry officials See, e.g., 
Monitoring Mechanism, supra note 44, at pt. 2(B). 
 52.  See id. at pt.1, § 9.4. 
 53.  The NTB Mechanism also aims at awareness creation among trade officials at the national 
level and calls upon EAC member states to allocate resources for eliminating NTBs. 
 54.  George Omondi, Trade Experts Tackle Non-Tariff Barriers at Nairobi Forum, BUSINESS 
DAILY (Jan. 7, 2009, 9:00 PM GMT), http://dev.bdafrica.com/rest-africa/policy-and-politics/financial-
services/trade-experts-tackle-non-tariff-barriers-nairobi. 
 55.  See EABC, EAC & Trademark East Africa [TMEA], Summary of Issues [and] 
Recommendations from the Regional [Secretary General]/CEO Meeting Held in the Kampala Uganda, 
at 2 (Feb. 27, 2013) (recommending to the EAC Council of Ministers the adoption of a legally binding 
instrument to remove NTBs). As originally proposed, the bill had as a very last resort reference to the 
EACJ if all other efforts to remove an NTB fail. Indeed, the EAC Council of Ministers in 2011 directed 
the EAC Secretariat to raise funds to develop a Legally Binding Enforcement Mechanism for the 
Elimination of Identified Non-Tariff Barriers. See TMEA, Annual Report 2013/2014, at 13, 
https://www.trademarkea.com/download/6836/; EAC, 28th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, 
EAC/CM/28/2013, ¶ 6.1.1.1 (Nov. 22–29, 2013) [hereinafter 28th Meeting of the Council of Ministers], 
http://www.meac.go.tz/sites/default/files/Documents/FINAL%20SIGNED%20REPORT%20FOR%20
THE%20MINISTERIAL%20SESSION%2028th%20MEETING%20OF%20THE%20COUNCIL.pd
f. Such a bill was developed with funding from Trademark East Africa and was subsequently referred 
to the EAC’s Sectorial Council on Judicial and Legal Affairs for input. See José Maciel, Growing 
Prosperity Through Trade: The Proposal of a Legally Binding Bill Addressing Non-Tariff Barriers in the 
East African Community, TMEA, http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/event/J%20Maciel%20Geneva 
%20-%20EAC%20Bill_0.pdf. As eventually passed, the Bill did not include referring the removal of 
NTBs to the East African Court of Justice. The final version of the bill is available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/event/J%20Maciel%20Annex%20III-NTB%20Bill%20revised% 
20monday(9th%20Sept%202014).pdf.  
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IV 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S PREFERENCE FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS 
This part advances three reasons for the absence of litigation arising from 
private sector actors. First, as the case study on removal of NTBs shows, the 
private sector prefers administrative mechanisms at the regional and national 
levels, rather than litigation in the EACJ, to address its concerns. Second, 
transplanted regional trade rules have little salience for business actors in East 
Africa. Third, the EACJ has limited remedial power, which further explains 
why business actors do not seem to prefer litigation to resolve their business 
problems. 
These three reasons help illustrate the argument that the EACJ has no 
authority over business cases. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen define the narrowest 
form of authority an IC might have as existing when “the losing party publicly 
acknowledges an obligation to comply with an IC ruling . . . [and takes] a 
consequential response . . . to the ruling . . . , such as paying compensation.”56 
The EABC does not recognize the authority of the EACJ in even this most 
narrow-authority sense—after all, it has preferred to use an administrative 
mechanism instead of litigation to pursue its goal of removing NTBs in intra-
EAC trade. 
A. The Private Sector’s Preference for Administrative Mechanisms Other than 
Litigation 
The EABC’s advocacy for and involvement in designing the NTB 
Monitoring Mechanism indicates its preference for advancing the concerns of its 
members through administrative mechanisms at the regional and national 
levels. Why has the private sector preferred administrative solutions to address 
its concerns? 
A close examination of the powers of the Council of Ministers (the Council) 
of the EAC partly accounts for the private sector’s preferences.57 The Council is 
the highest policy organ of the EAC.58 It is charged with promoting, monitoring, 
and keeping in “constant review the implementation of the programmes of the 
[EAC].”59 Pursuant to this mandate, the Council decided that all of its decisions 
and directives had to be accompanied by clear time frames so that it could more 
easily monitor and follow up on their implementation.60 Thus, at every meeting, 
the Council receives a status report from the Secretariat showing the status of 
its previous decisions or directives—whether they have been implemented, 
 
 56.  Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 13. 
 57.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9(1)(b) (establishing the Council).  
 58.  Id. art. 14(1). 
 59.  Id. art. 14(2). 
 60.  See 28th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, supra note 55, at 8, EAC/CM/28/2013 (Nov. 22–
29, 2013). 
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partially implemented, or are pending implementation.61 The first order of 
business in each Council meeting is to give directions on unimplemented 
decisions.62 Council decisions are published in the EAC Gazette and usually 
come into force upon publication.63 Decisions, regulations, and directives of the 
Council are not only binding on EAC partner states, but also on all EAC organs 
and institutions, other than the Summit, the East African Legislative Assembly, 
and the EACJ.64 From this perspective, the Council has the power to order the 
removal of NTBs and the EABC, as an accredited nongovernmental body, has 
the day-to-day access to the machinery of the EAC that reports to the Council. 
This access is partly facilitated by the fact that both the EAC Secretariat and 
EABC’s offices are currently located in Arusha, Tanzania,65 and by the fact that 
the EABC has observer status within the EAC.66 
The EABC prefers a strategy that emphasizes administrative action over 
judicial review because such action is arguably more effective than judicial 
review. This preference must be seen in light of the low levels of legalization of 
EAC integration. Regions or regimes with high legalization are accompanied by 
heightened obligations, greater precision in rules, and delegation of rule 
interpretation to third parties. That is not the case in East Africa. The EACJ’s 
Strategic Plan for 2010 through 2015, for example, argues that a lack of 
recognition of the EACJ’s role as a dispute resolution organ at the core of the 
integration process is one of its “crippling challenges.”67 
Further, the rules embodied in EAC treaties calling for the elimination and 
removal of NTBs are rather generic and do not go into detail, for example, by 
listing the consequences of noncompliance.68 The absence of precision makes 
 
 61.  In a decision of the 15th Summit, the Secretary General was directed to “among others: report 
regularly on the implementation of decisions including non-compliance” and “submit progress reports 
on implementation of major decisions and directives of the Council and Summit every six months.” 
EAC, Communiqué of the 15th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State, ¶ 5(a), (e) (Nov. 30, 2013) 
[hereinafter Communiqué], http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view 
&gid=353&Itemid=77. Pursuant to this directive, see for example, EAC, Communiqué of the 30th 
Council of Ministers, ¶ 1, EAC/CM/30/CM/2014 (Nov. 20–28, 2014) http://www.meaca.go.ug/index 
.php/press/doc_download/76-30th-meeting-of-the-council-of-ministers-nairobi-kenya-20th-28th-
november-2014-.html.  
 62.  See Communiqué, supra note 61. 
 63.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 14(5). 
 64.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 16. 
 65.  In 2014, Rwanda offered the EABC some land on which to build its headquarters. The EABC 
will therefore move its headquarters to Kigali, Rwanda but will retain an office in Arusha so that it can 
maintain its links with the EAC.  
 66.  See supra Part III.  
 67.  EACJ, Strategic Plan: 2010–2015, at v (Apr. 2010).  
68.    For example, Article 5(2)(s) of the Common Market Protocol provides that EAC Partner 
States agree to “eliminate tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade . . .” without defining what 
constitutes a nontariff barrier. This leaves questions unanswered. For example, to what extent and 
under what conditions would sanitary and phytosanitary measures or price and quality controls be 
considered NTBs? Or does the definition only include technical barriers to trade or pre-shipment 
inspections? What about nontechnical measures such as police roadblocks? See Common Market 
Protocol, supra note 33. 
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the rules more amenable to monitoring than to litigation.69 In fact, at the time of 
the establishment of the Customs Union in 2004, the EACJ had hardly decided 
any cases at all—its first decision was issued in 2006.70 Thus, resort to judicial 
enforcement for removal of NTBs may not have promised the EABC much 
given there was no history of successful cases on removal of NTBs. By contrast, 
the EAC Council of Ministers offered the promise of a ready avenue and real 
power with the prospect of a cooperative approach to a partnership that would 
involve the private sector. The Council offered to the EABC the promise of 
more leeway to propel the EAC’s agenda, both because of the Council’s policy-
making autonomy as well as the fact that its decisions are binding on EAC 
states. The EACJ does not have the discretion to collect detailed information 
about barriers that businesses face in EAC trade or even to tailor solutions for 
removing specific NTBs in the way the Council does.  
Another important reason accounts for the EABC’s preference for an 
administrative approach. Removing NTBs to competition invariably exposes 
some companies to more competitive regional and international companies. 
Hence, while companies engaged in importation would prefer removal of 
NTBs, those predominantly supplying for the domestic market may not favor 
their removal since NTBs act to buffer them from regional competitors. 
Removal of NTBs would also be accompanied by revenue losses for the country 
that removes NTBs. Even the removal of barriers such as police checks and 
weigh-and-bridge stations is not costless. The police and other officials who 
benefit from the corruption associated with these barriers represent an interest 
group that accounts for the presence of these barriers. Removal of these 
barriers therefore creates future uncertainty that might not be politically 
acceptable.71 Seen this way, removing NTBs is first and foremost a political 
challenge. The preference for political solutions through the EAC Council of 
Ministers makes sense to business actors who are familiar with how government 
agencies operate and how to overcome the types of political and other costs 
associated with removing NTBs. 
In fact, large businesses in East Africa rarely seek judicial redress against 
governments in the countries where they operate. Governments are important 
clients for these businesses. This is in part because in many developing 
countries, including in the EAC, governments have large procurement 
budgets.72 Large businesses make large profits when they win these 
 
 69.  Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 661, 
663 (2000).  
       70.   See John Eudes Ruhangisa, The East African Court of Justice: Ten Years of Operation 
(Achievements and Challenges), 12, http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/EACJ-Ten-
Years-of-Operation.pdf. 
 71.  On future uncertainty as a cost of increased legalization, see generally Kenneth W. Abbott and 
Duncan Snidal, Toward a Theory of International Legalization, 53 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); see also Beth 
A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT’L ORG. 573, 584 (2000) 
(showing that states with a high susceptibility to balance of payment crisis are less likely to commit to 
high legalization).  
 72.  See Dinfin Mulupi, Are Kenyan Companies Ignoring Government Work at their Own Peril?, 
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procurement contracts. Suing the government, particularly in a regional court, is 
likely to jeopardize a business’s relationship with the government. Businesses 
want long-term, strategic relationships—they avoid legalistic and adversarial 
relationships that might undermine building a relationship of trust with 
governments. Placing a call to a high-ranking governmental official is more 
likely to expeditiously resolve problems that a business is encountering with the 
government or in the marketplace than a court order is likely to resolve them. 
EAC member states have taken steps to give businesses alternatives to 
traditional litigation. The EAC Customs Market Protocol, for example, 
establishes a specialized administrative mechanism to resolve disputes.73 It 
sidesteps the EACJ as the dispute-settlement mechanism.74 Further, the EAC 
Common Market Protocol gives national courts jurisdiction to decide cases 
arising under it—national courts are given the jurisdiction to decide whether an 
EAC member government has conducted itself inconsistently with the Common 
Market Protocol.75 These provisions are consistent with a widely held view that 
government officials in Africa do not like to file cases against each other or to 
defend suits filed by businesses in judicial proceedings, particularly in regional 
courts.76 Government officials, like business actors in the EAC region, also 
prefer alternatives to litigation. They provide their offices to resolve disputes 
with businesses and governments that are members of their subregional trading 
system. 
The next section discusses the lack of a litigation strategy among business 
actors in East Africa. Litigation around business issues, especially at the 
regional level, so far has not been a preferred strategy, and it does not have a 
history or predicate, such as a bar specializing in regional trade law practice and 
 
HOW WE MADE IT IN AFRICA (June 6, 2014) (quoting Joanne Mwangi, PMS Group), 
http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/are-kenyan-companies-ignoring-government-work-at-their-
peril/40223/ (“The biggest spender in this economy will always be government so if you are not doing 
business with government it means you are already fishing in a pond when there is an ocean right next 
to you.”). 
 73.  Customs Union Protocol, supra note 31, art. 40 (stating that the annexes of the protocol are 
integrated into the protocol); EAC, The East African Community Customs Union (Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism) Regulations, Annex XI, at Regulation 5 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Mechanism] 
(establishing the dispute settlement mechanism).  
 74.  See generally Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 73. 
 75.  Common Market Protocol, supra note 33, art. 54. Notably, the First Division of the EACJ has 
decided that these alternative dispute settlement forums were not designed to undermine its authority 
as the preeminent court with jurisdiction to determine whether or not a treaty of the EAC has or has 
not been violated. See E. African Ctr. for Trade Policy and Law v. Sec’y Gen. of EAC, Ref. No. 9 of 
2012, ¶¶ 76–78 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2013), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FI_ 
EACommunity-EACTPL.pdf (“The dispute settlement mechanisms provided for under the Customs 
Union and the Common Market Protocol do not oust the original jurisdiction of the Court of handling 
disputes thereunder.”). 
 76.  P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Dispute Recognition and Dispute Settlement in Integration Processes: The 
COMESA Experience, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 437, 441 (1995) (arguing that many regional 
integration schemes in developing countries opt for dispute-avoidance frameworks). Notably, none of 
the forty African countries that are members of the World Trade Organization have ever brought a 
case before its dispute-settlement system. 
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litigation, on which it can be built the same way that litigation around business 
issues occurs within each of the EAC member states. 
B. Transplanted Regional Trade Rules Have Little Salience for Business Actors 
Business laws in East Africa—such as those of contract, agency, partnership, 
and corporations—are a colonial inheritance.77 They were imposed under 
colonial rule to serve primarily the needs and interests of foreign investors.78 
The fact that these laws were not designed to serve the needs of local businesses 
means these business laws have attracted little legitimacy or relevance 
particularly for informal businesses.79 When formally incorporated business 
actors in East Africa resort to law or judicial dispute settlement, they invariably 
invoke national business laws and national courts because these laws govern 
their incorporation and every aspect of their operations. Regional laws such as 
those of the EAC do not apply to any aspect of day-to-day operations of 
business actors. As such, regional courts such as the EACJ are quite removed 
from the workings of business actors. In short, the underlying legal 
infrastructure for trade in the EAC region is still national—each member 
country has its own separate law of contract, law of agency and partnership, 
corporate law, and so on. 
Regional trade integration rules and their attendant dispute-settlement 
provisions, also transplanted from Europe, were superimposed on national 
business laws in the post-independence period. Notwithstanding the increased 
pace of adopting these regional trade rules in the recent past,80 even 
sophisticated business lawyers who advise multinational corporations doing 
business in East Africa do not see these regional trade rules as options for their 
clients.81 This is largely because regional trade rules are a recent historical 
phenomenon82 and have not gained the salience that domestic business laws 
have had in structuring business deals or in providing an alternative dispute-
settlement mechanism to the predominance of national courts. 
Another related reason for the non-use of regional courts is that a broad 
 
 77.  James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013, 
1031–32 (2007) (“[T]he introduction of rules of private property, tort, and contract . . . helped to 
consolidate . . . an informal empire of trade and commerce in the protectorate [present-day Kenya].”).   
 78.  Id. 
 79.  The EAC treaty regime can therefore be argued to suffer from the “transplant effect”—it is 
disconnected from the local context. For more on this in the context of regional integration, see Karen 
J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Osvaldo Salídas, Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The 
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 69 AM. J. COMP. L. 629 (2012). 
 80.  See generally James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 421 (2011)(discussing the increased number of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
with an emphasis on neoliberal economic ideals). 
 81.  Interview with the General Counsel to a large multinational bank, in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 2, 
2013). 
 82.  The EAC was revived in 2000. Its Customs Protocol came into effect in 2005 and its Common 
Market Protocol came into effect in 2010. Its Monetary Union Protocol was signed by the members in 
November 2013 and will come into effect in 2015.  
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cross-section of the population of the EAC lacks knowledge of the regional 
courts’ underlying trade-integration rules.83 Yet there are significant commercial 
transactions within and across national boundaries in the region, especially 
those involving big domestic and foreign firms. What is more, a large segment 
of the population has for a long time relied upon traditional commercial 
customs for engaging in business and resolving disputes.84 These customs 
predate the enactment of formal laws with the advent of colonialism and their 
subsequent amendment and updating under the era of neoliberal economic 
reform since the early 1990s. These customary modes of dispute settlement, 
unlike formal legal rules such as those of the EAC or national business law 
systems, are based on social controls such as “religion, custom, habit and rules 
of practical prudence.”85 
Further, regional trade regimes are largely invisible, particularly to small- 
and medium-scale business actors who are overwhelmingly in the informal 
sector. The informal sector, which dominates the manufacturing, commerce, 
finance, and mining sectors in Africa,86 employs more people than the formal 
sector and is concentrated in urban areas where secondary school graduates 
flock in search of jobs.87 The informal sector in many African countries thrives 
because the formal sector cannot absorb the high numbers of unemployed 
people. The informal nature of business deals in East Africa is reflected by the 
fact that a large majority of small- and medium-scale firms enter into oral 
contracts with their suppliers.88 Thus, a very large segment of trade and business 
 
 83.  Interview with Judge C, EACJ First Instance Division, in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 2, 2013) 
(noting that knowledge of EAC law among judges in Kenya was “poor”); see also Interview with EACJ 
Appellate Judge A and President, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013) (noting the various efforts to 
create awareness of the EACJ). 
 84.  See Antony N. Allot, The Future of African Law, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 216, 232–33 (Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965) (arguing that in newly independent 
African countries, keeping courts nonprofessionalized would make justice local, speedy, flexible and 
that there existed a “whole apparatus of arbitration” outside the formal European court system). 
 85.  Paul Brietzke, Private Law in Ethiopia, 18 J. AFR. L. 149, 155 (1974). 
 86.  Donald L. Sparks & Stephen T. Barnett, The Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: Out of the 
Shadows to Foster Sustainable Development and Equity?, 9 INT’L BUS. ECON. RES. J. 1, 1 (2010), 
https://datapro.fiu.edu/campusedge/files/articles/barnetts3107.pdf. According to Kenya’s Economic 
Survey (2012), the informal sector in Kenya contributed 85.7% of the total employment created in 
2011, by providing 445,900 jobs—as compared to the formal sectors’ contribution of 14.3%. KENYA 
NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC SURVEY 2012, at 65 (2012). The survey notes that the 
Kenyan Government recognizes the potential of the sector in creating employment and reducing 
poverty levels—agendas that are central in the Kenya Vision 2030. Id. at 75–76. For its part Tanzania 
has developed Private Sector Development Strategy with a view to encouraging, among others, the 
informal sector to formalize their businesses. Id. The Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced a fully 
fledged Department of Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) to deal with informal sector 
including overseeing the implementation of the SMEs Policy and strategies. See World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: EAC, WT/TPR/S/271 (Oct. 17, 2012).  
 87.  See Sparks & Barnett, supra note 86, at 3 (observing that lack of opportunity for secondary 
education drives migration into urban areas for work in the informal sector). 
 88.  Joseph Mpeera Ntayi, Gerrit Rooks, Sarah Eyaa & Flavian Zeija, Contract Enforcement in 
Ugandan Business Transactions: The Case of Small and Medium Enterprises, INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH FUND, at 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/ 
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takes place outside formal structures such as privately incorporated entities, and 
even outside the national judicial systems. These informal businesses do not 
interface with formal government structures such as registrars of companies, tax 
and social security administrations, or government entities that oversee the 
protection of labor laws. These businesses are therefore unlikely to ever resort 
to regional, dispute-settlement systems.89 In addition, many of these informal 
micro-, small-, and medium-scale enterprises are owned by entrepreneurs who 
are not literate in English or French, the languages that overwhelmingly tend to 
be the language of the law and formal dispute settlement. 
Thus, even though the EACJ has tried to simplify its rules of procedure and 
gone out of its way to promote its accessibility in East Africa,90 as of 2013, the 
EACJ decided only four cases challenging EAC member governments for 
conduct relating to the business environment.91 None of these cases directly 
related to a violation of EAC’s regional trade rules. These four cases are 
discussed below.92 In any event, the EACJ’s emerging jurisprudence shows that 
it is most likely to be accessible to well-funded businesses that can afford 
lawyers to make the kind of sophisticated legal arguments to which farmers, 
fishermen, and handicraftsmen who trade across national boundaries in the 
EAC would hardly have access. In short, regional trade rules are not tailored to 
address “local conditions” and are not designed as the “best fit” for these 
conditions.93 
C. EACJ Has Limited Remedial Power 
The EACJ’s jurisdiction only allows it to declare governmental conduct to 
be inconsistent with a treaty of the EAC.94 Although the Court has granted 
injunctions restraining member governments, the EAC Secretary General, and 
other EAC organs from continuing to violate the EAC treaties, the EACJ does 
not have jurisdiction to grant damages or to employ the broad array of remedial 
powers that national courts have; it simply lacks a compliance jurisdiction.95 For 
 
articles/contract-enforcement-ugandan-business-transactions-case-small-and-medium-enterprises.  
 89.  See Isabelle Deschamps, Assessing the Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit 
des affaires’s Contributions to Poverty Reduction in Africa: A Grounded Outlook, 6 L. DEV. REV. 111 
(2013). But see Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the 
Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 17 (2005) (interviewing business actors and coming to a different 
conclusion based on selected provisions of OHADA). 
 90.  See Gathii, supra note 2, at 274 (discussing the accessibility of EACJ due to low financial costs 
and procedural barriers). 
 91.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 92.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 93.  See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business 
Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 789 (2009); Daniel 
Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003). This conclusion is also 
consistent with another contribution in this symposium. See Claire Moore Dickerson, The OHADA 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration: Exogenous Forces Contributing to its Influence, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,  2016, at 86–87. 
 94.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 28. 
 95.  In an interview, an EABC official argued that the EACJ lacks jurisdiction over commercial 
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this reason, a business seeking relief for a particular business problem is much 
better off going to a national court than to the EACJ. 
This limitation in the remedial regime of the EACJ partly explains why, to 
date, cases involving commercial actors suing their governments for 
noncompliance with EAC treaties have been rare. One such exceptional case 
involved allegations of contravention of the protections of cross-border 
investment in the EAC’s Common Market Protocol.96 There, a Kenyan 
company sued Standard Chartered Bank (a Ugandan company), the Ugandan 
government, and the National Social Security Fund (another Ugandan 
company).97 The issue was a bank guarantee issued by Standard Chartered 
Bank pursuant to an eight-million-dollar arbitral award made in favor of the 
Kenyan company.98 The case against Standard Chartered Bank was dismissed 
on the basis that the bank was not a member state of the EAC and the EACJ 
could only entertain suits against EAC member states.99 The case against the 
government of Uganda was also dismissed on the ground that the bank 
guarantee—the basis of the cause of action—had already expired pursuant to 
orders of the highest court in Uganda.100 
The second case involved waiver of customs warehouse rent and loss of 
consignment. The case Modern Holdings v. Kenya Ports Authority et al.101 arose 
following delays in clearing perishable goods out of customs warehouses in 
Mombasa by Modern Holdings. The Kenya Ports Authority transferred the 
perishable goods to a private warehouse that then claimed a large fee from 
Modern Holdings.102 Modern Holdings was unable to raise the amount.103 In the 
interim, all goods of Modern Holdings had expired.104 Modern Holdings brought 
suit against the Kenya Ports Authority alleging a violation of the EAC 
Establishment Treaty.105 The EACJ dismissed the case, holding that the case 
was not brought against an EAC member state and that since the EACJ could 
 
cases and that partly explained the absence of commercial cases before the Court. Interview with 
EABC official, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013) (noting that the decision in the Modern Holdings 
case shows that the EACJ could not effectively resolve business cases). 
 96. Alcon Int’l Ltd. v. The Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda et al., Ref. No. 6 of 2010 (EACJ 
First Instance Div. 2011), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Alcon-International-2010-6-
judgment-2011.pdf. Notably, when this case was first heard, the First Division dismissed it. The 
Appellate Division reinstated it because the First Division had failed to establish if it had jurisdiction. 
The 2010 decision dismissed the case again on the grounds discussed in the main text of this article.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 5.  
 99.  Id. at 14. 
 100.  Id. at 17. In any event, the First Division held that the provisions of the Common Market 
Protocol could not have been infringed because the facts of the case occurred before the protocol had 
come into effect. Id. at 23. 
 101.  Ref. No. 1 of 2008, 2–3 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2009), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/11/no-1-of-2008.pdf.  
 102.  Id. at 2. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 3. 
 105.  Id. at 2. 
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only entertain suits against an EAC state, the Court had no jurisdiction.106 
The third case, Ndorimana v. Burundi,107 unsuccessfully sought damages 
from the government of Burundi arising from business losses suffered as a 
result of the litigant’s imprisonment by Burundi.108 
The fourth case, Kyarimpa v. Uganda109 concerned an unsuccessful challenge 
to Uganda’s alleged irregular procurement of a Chinese firm to construct a 
hydroelectric power plant for inconsistency with the EAC Establishment 
Treaty. 
Neither the Alcon case nor the Modern Holding case was decided on the 
merits. Both cases were dismissed on procedural grounds, in part because they 
were not brought against an organ of the EAC or an EAC partner state.110 The 
decisions in these two cases have been cited as having chilled the EABC, the 
largest regional business group, from advising their members to take cases to 
the EACJ.111 Although the EACJ has jurisdiction to act as an arbitral forum, to 
date there has been only one reported instance in which a private party 
identified the EACJ as an arbitral forum in a business-to-business contract.112 
Further, private parties do not have standing to sue each other because 
private party access is limited to suing governments.113 The EACJ’s jurisdiction 
only extends to private parties when they select the Court as the designated 
dispute settler in their contract’s forum-selection clause.114 This lack of 
jurisdiction to entertain business-to-business or business-to-individual cases is 
yet another reason why businesses may strongly prefer to take cases to national 
courts. After all, businesses are more familiar with national courts deciding such 
cases. And national courts have developed a record of experience and expertise 
in deciding business law cases. 
The growing reputation of the EACJ as a human rights court makes it less 
likely that businesses would regard it as the go-to court to resolve their business 
problems.115 The next part of this article examines how human rights groups 
 
 106.  Id. at 11. 
 107.  Ndorimana v. Att’y Gen. of Burundi, Ref. No. 2 of 2013, 14 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2014), 
http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/REF.-NO-2-OF-2013-BENOIT-NDORIMANA-28-
NOVEMBER-2014.pdf. 
 108.  Id. at 3. 
 109.  Kyarimpa v. Att’y Gen. Uganda, Ref. No. 4 of 2013, 26–27 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2014).  
 110.  See Modern Holdings, Ref. No. 1 of 2008 at 11 (holding that the Kenyan Ports Authority was 
not an institution subject to the EAC Establishment Treaty and therefore the EACJ had no 
jurisdiction); Alcon Int’l Ltd., Ref. No. 6 of 2010 (holding that the respondents were not subject to the 
EAC Establishment Treaty and therefore the EACJ had no jurisdiction). 
 111.  Interview at EABC, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013) (noting that the decision in the 
Modern Holding case shows that the EACJ could not effectively resolve business cases). 
 112.  See Paul Juma, EAC Court Still Unpopular 9 Years In On, THE EAST AFRICAN, (May 3, 2010) 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/910494/-/pf9allz/-/index.html (discussing that Uganda has 
included such a clause in a Railway Concession Agreement). 
 113.  See Modern Holdings, Ref. No.1 of 2008 at 10–11 (holding that Article 30 of the EAC 
Establishment Treaty contemplates only suits against Partner States of the EAC). 
 114.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 32. 
 115.  Interview at EABC, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013).  
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have frequently brought cases to the Court and in so doing have solidified the 
authority of the Court among individuals and groups interested in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
V 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF THE EACJ 
Human rights groups such as the East African Law Society (EALS), the 
regional bar association, have adopted a litigation approach to achieve their 
goals of promoting the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in East Africa. 
This legalistic enforcement style differs from the preference of the private 
sector for a cooperative relationship with EAC governments to achieve their 
goals. Adversarial legal accountability to promote the rule of law, democracy, 
and human rights was borrowed from the national experience of pro-democracy 
and human rights groups in one of the EAC member states—Kenya.116 Officials 
who worked for these groups in Kenya helped create similar mechanisms when 
the EACJ was established.117 They shaped the newly established EALS to adopt 
a litigation strategy to promote human rights.118 Through the advocacy of these 
groups, they succeeded in persuading the judges to make the rights recognized 
in the EAC Establishment Treaty justiciable through repeated adversarial and 
litigious interactions.119 
For these and other reasons discussed below, the EACJ has intermediate 
authority over human rights cases. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen say intermediate 
authority exists only when the behavior and decisions of “potential future 
litigants as well as government officials charged with implementing 
international rules as interpreted by the court, such as executive branch 
officials, administrative agency officials, and judges,” is affected by an IC’s 
decisions.120 However, it is quite clear that the EACJ does not have extensive 
authority. Whereas Kelemen argues that the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (CJEU) has extensive authority,121 the following findings indicate 
the EACJ is unable to “consistently shape law and politics” in East Africa122 as 
the CJEU is able to do in Europe. 
The achievements of human rights groups, however, cannot be 
underestimated. They have persuaded judges of the EACJ that the Court has 
jurisdiction over human rights cases notwithstanding the Council’s failure to 
formally extend such jurisdiction to it as required by the EAC Establishment 
 
 116.  See Gathii, supra note 2, at 278 (discussing in particular the role of Donald Deya who rose 
from the ranks of the Law Society of Kenya to the then fledgling EALS Secretariat). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 56, at 10. 
 121.  R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,  2016, at 118–119, 140. 
 122.  Id.  
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Treaty, a move that the Council has been considering since 2004. 
The EACJ’s path to becoming a human rights court began with the 2007 
Katabazi case.123 The case arose following the arrest of several individuals who 
had just been granted bail by the Uganda High Court within the precincts of the 
High Court of Uganda.124 These arrests were carried out on November 15, 2005 
by a paramilitary group of the Ugandan government.125 The events have been 
described as “the worst attack on judicial independence through the siege of the 
High Court.”126 Not only did the paramilitary men interfere with the preparation 
of the bail papers; they also took the men before a military general court-
martial, where they were charged with unlawful possession of firearms and 
terrorism under the same facts that had supported the previous charges for 
which they had been granted bail.127 The Ugandan Constitutional Court, on 
petition from the Uganda Law Society, declared the detentions unconstitutional 
and ordered the individuals released from detention.128 The Ugandan 
government failed to comply with that decision, and a complaint was thereafter 
filed in the EACJ.129 The complainants challenged their re-arrest, military 
charges, and detention as inconsistent with the provisions of the EAC 
Establishment Treaty.130 They argued that this conduct, together with the refusal 
by the Ugandan government to comply with the bail order, constituted an 
infringement of Articles 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) of the EAC Establishment 
Treaty.131 
Article 5(1) of the EAC Establishment Treaty provides that “the objectives 
of the [EAC] shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening 
and deepening co-operation among Partner States in political, social and cultural 
fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial 
affairs.”132 Article 6 provides that the objectives of the EAC include the 
“promotion . . . of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”133 Article 7(2) provides 
that the “principles of good governance, including adherence to the principles 
 
 123.  Katabazi et al. v. Sec’y Gen. EAC et al., Ref. No. 1 of 2007 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2007), 
http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf. 
 124.  Id. at 1–2. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Kituo Cha Katiba, E. Afr. Ctr. Constitutional Dev., Five-Year Strategic Plan 2011–2016, at 10 
(2011). Notably, the EACJ uses the term security personnel while Kituo Cha Katiba uses the term 
paramilitary personnel. Compare id. with Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007 at 2.  
 127.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007 at 2. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 2–3. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 6 (setting out the fundamental principles of the 
EAC, which include the “promotion and the protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”). Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 
2007 at 3. 
 132.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007 at 15 (quoting EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5(1)) 
(emphasis added).   
 133.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 6. 
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of democracy, the rule of law, social justice and the maintenance of universally 
accepted standards of human rights” are operational principles of the EAC.134 
Furthermore, Article 8(1)(c) obliges EAC partner states to “abstain from any 
measures likely to jeopardi[z]e the achievement of those objectives or the 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.”135 
Uganda challenged the EACJ’s jurisdiction on the basis that the Court does 
not have jurisdiction over human rights.136 The EACJ dismissed this 
jurisdictional challenge and held that it could decide human rights cases.137 It 
held that it had a responsibility not to “abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction 
of interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes 
allegation[s] of human rights violation[s].”138 The Court then held that Articles 
5(1), 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) require partner states to abide by the decisions of their 
courts.139 The Court held that it had an obligation to “provide a check on the 
exercise of the responsibility . . . to protect the rule of law,”140 and that Uganda’s 
conduct constituted “an unacceptable and dangerous precedent, which would 
undermine the rule of law.”141 
The Katabazi case established a cause of action for challenging violations of 
human rights of EAC member states. Several cases followed. In Rugumba v. 
Secretary General of the East African Community et al., the EACJ held that 
Rwanda’s incommunicado detention of one of its citizens without trial was 
contrary to Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the EAC Establishment Treaty, which 
obliges partner states to be bound by principles of good governance and the 
rule of law.142 The Court also invoked provisions of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, referred to in Article 7(2) of the EAC 
Establishment Treaty, and asserted that these provisions were not decorative or 
cosmetic parts of the EAC Establishment Treaty but were “meant to bind 
[p]artner [s]tates.”143 The Court declined to hold that exhaustion of domestic 
remedies was a bar to bringing the suit.144 Similarly, in Ariviza v. Attorney 
General of Kenya et al., the Court had held that internal law could not be 
invoked to justify a violation of the EAC Establishment Treaty.145 
 
 134.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007 at 16 (quoting EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 7(2)) 
(emphasis added). 
 135.  EAC Establishment Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8(1)(c). 
 136.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007 at 12. 
 137.  Id. at 14–16. 
 138.  Id. at 16. 
 139.  Id. at 15–23. 
 140.  Id. at 23. 
 141.  Id. at 22. 
 142.  Ref. No. 8 of 2010, 25–26 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2011), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf. 
 143.  Id. ¶ 37. 
 144.  Id. ¶¶ 30–31 (reasoning that a mathematical computation of time in a criminal case when the 
conduct complained of was a chain of continuous events would be inappropriate). 
 145.  Application No. 3 of 2010, 10–11 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2010), arising from Ref. No. 7 of 
2010, http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/RULING-OF-1ST-DECEMBER-2010.pdf. 
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In Independent Medical Legal Unit v. Attorney General of Kenya et al.,146 the 
EACJ entertained yet another important human rights case. This case tested 
yet again the argument that the Court does not have jurisdiction over human 
rights, as Uganda claimed in Katabazi.147 The Court, consistent with its Katabazi 
decision, held that while it did not have jurisdiction over human rights, it 
nevertheless had jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the EAC Establishment 
Treaty even if cases included allegations violating human rights provisions.148 
Independent Medical Legal Unit involved allegations of executions, torture, 
cruelty, and inhuman and degrading treatment committed by agents of the 
Government of Kenya in the Mount Elgon area.149 Notably, the plaintiff was an 
NGO that investigates human rights violations using forensic evidence.150 
As has become the tradition in these human rights cases, the Kenyan 
government brought an unsuccessful challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
Court.151 The Court reiterated that even though it does not have human rights 
jurisdiction as contemplated in Article 27(2), it has jurisdiction to interpret the 
EAC Establishment Treaty.152 Hence, as long as allegations brought before the 
Court relate to an interpretation of an EAC Establishment Treaty, the fact that 
they involve allegations of violations of human rights does not preclude 
jurisdiction.153 The Court noted that the only limitation to its jurisdiction is a suit 
against officers of a partner state—other than the Attorney General, the party 
who could be sued for Kenya’s responsibility for the maintenance of law and 
order—is not permissible.154 Thus, only the Attorney General of the partner 
state may be sued for EAC Establishment Treaty violations.155 
In all of these cases, the EALS played a critical role supporting the lawyers 
and litigants in the cases by filing amicus curiae and by having their lawyers 
appear in court together with the litigants’ lawyers, or on behalf of the litigants’ 
lawyers when they could not travel to Arusha.156 Public-interest advocacy is one 
of the EALS’s primary mandates.157 This includes public-interest litigation that 
 
 146.  Ref. No. 3 of 2010 (EACJ First Instance Div. 2011), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/11/3-of-20101.pdf. Notably, the First Instance Division’s opinion in the header of the case 
referred the applicant to as the Independent Medical Unit, instead of the Independent Medical Legal 
Unit. On appeal the Appellate Division used the correct name of the applicant in the header of the 
case: Independent Medical Legal Unit. 
 147.  Id. at 3–6. 
 148.  Id. at 4. 
 149.  Id. at 2. 
 150.  See A Just World Free from Torture, INDEP. MEDICO-LEGAL UNIT, http://www.imlu.org/ 
template/who-we-are.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  
 151.  Indep. Med. Unit, Ref. No. 3 of 2010 at 3–6. 
 152.  Id. at 5–6. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. at 7. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Interview with Selemani Kinyunyu of the Pan African Lawyers Union and previously of the 
EALS (May 2013). 
 157.  Our Programmes, EALS, http://www.ealawsociety.org/index.php/our-programmes (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015) (stating public interest advocacy as a program of the EALS). Among the EALS’s other 
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seeks “judicial re-affirmation” of the obligation of East African states to 
promote and protect human rights.158 In 2011 alone, the EALS filed three cases 
before the EACJ.159 In 2010, prior to these cases being filed, the EALS 
convened a Colloquium of Legal Scholars on Litigation Strategies before the 
EACJ and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was 
attended by judges from national courts and regional tribunals (including the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights), as well as lawyers from East 
and Southern Africa.160 Among the outcomes from this meeting were offers for 
technical support and for institution of the three cases filed in 2011.161 
This above discussion shows the EACJ assumed jurisdiction over human 
rights consistently with the preferences of civil society groups such as the 
EALS. Civil society groups like the EALS pursued and supported a litigation 
strategy before the EACJ to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human 
rights as core values of regional integration in East Africa. This strategy of 
engagement with the EAC fundamentally differs from that of the EABC, which 
has by and large preferred to collaborate with East African governments and 
the EAC in nonadversarial ways, for example, with the EABC’s NTB strategy. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
This symposium reflects on the authority of ICs in their social and political 
context. In doing so, this article has examined the predominance of human 
rights litigation in the EACJ and the absence of trade cases on the EACJ’s 
docket. The absence of trade cases indicates a preference on the part of the 
EABC for administrative mechanisms to address the concerns of the private 
sector in East Africa.162 
 
objectives are the professional development of its members, supporting regional integration, and 
institutional development. Id. 
 158.  Public Interest Advocacy, EALS, http://www.ealawsociety.org/index.php/our-programmes/ 
public-interest-advocacy (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 159.  The cases are: EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2011 against the EAC Secretary General, 
“challenging certain provisions in the Common Market Protocol and Customs Union Protocol that 
purport to oust the [j]urisdiction of the EACJ as granted by the EAC [Establishment] Treaty;” EACJ 
Reference No. 2 of 2011 against the Attorney General of Uganda and the EAC Secretary General, 
“relating to the [h]uman [r]ights [v]iolations in Uganda during the walk to work processions;” and 
EACJ Reference No. 3 against the Attorneys Generals of Uganda and Kenya as well as the EAC 
Secretary General “relating to the rendition of Kenyan [c]itizens to Uganda. EALS, ANNUAL REPORT: 
NOVEMBER 2010–NOVEMBER 2011, at 15 (2011), http://www.ealawsociety.org/images/publications/ 
annual_report/annual_report_2011.pdf.  
 160.  Id. at 14.  
 161.  Id. Following the Colloquium of Scholars conference, the EALS’s Human Rights and Strategic 
Litigation Committee and its Regional Integration and International Relations Committee met to 
approve the institution of the cases. Id. at 14–15. 
 162.  It is also notable that there is no international trade-law practice in East Africa that revolves 
around EAC law. The lack of an international trade bar that can identify cases and urge their clients to 
bring them to the EACJ contributes to the lack of trade cases before the EACJ. This, in addition to the 
fact that the EABC is predominantly run by business professionals and the lawyers who work have no 
power of initiative to lobby in favor of creating a litigation strategy for trade matters as human rights 
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The predominance of human rights litigation on the docket of the EACJ 
shows that human rights groups and lawyers recognize the authority of the 
EACJ while the EABC, and therefore the formal private sector, do not. From 
this perspective, business actors in East Africa do not validate the theoretical 
assumption that business actors demand binding, third-party dispute settlement 
to guarantee a stable legal and policy environment for commercial 
transactions.163 The EABC has to date eschewed litigation, preferring to 
cooperatively work with the EAC and EAC member governments about how 
best to remove NTBs. The reappearance of trade barriers after successful 
removal through the trade barrier removal mechanism prompted EAC business 
CEOs in 2014 to propose a legally binding framework for their removal. This, 
together with the explicit extension of the EACJ’s jurisdiction over trade, 
investment, and monetary issues in 2013, may open the way for business cases in 
the future. 
As previously discussed, business actors do not recognize the authority of 
the EACJ. Small- and medium-scale enterprises are not even aware of the 
EAC’s regional trade rules, and when they are aware of them, they do not 
resort to judicial dispute settlement before the Court. Because the EACJ has 
limited remedial power for business actors interested in judicial relief, domestic 
courts are a preferable alternative. According to the Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen’s definition of authority, which presupposes the filing of cases,164 the 
fact that business actors have not filed cases before the EACJ means that it has 
no real authority over business cases. 
By contrast, the EACJ has intermediate authority over human rights cases 
at a thin-elite level. Civil society actors, including the EALS and an increasing 
stream of litigants, have approached the Court for relief since the Katabazi 
decision of 2007. Academics interested in the rule of law, human rights, 
democracy in East Africa, and beyond have started producing a new stream of 
scholarship about the EACJ’s human rights cases.165 Donors such as the Soros 
Foundation have funded conferences on the role of the Court and have 
financially supported the judges of the EACJ to visit and learn from courts in 
other jurisdictions. 
The success of human rights cases before the EACJ has also spurred the 
initiation of a line of cases challenging the environmental conduct of EAC 
 
lawyers have, is another factor that has contributed to the lack of trade cases before the EACJ.  
 163.  Kahler, supra note 69.  
 164.  At the beginning of their introduction to this issue, Alter, Helfer, and Madsen argue that an 
international court has as one of its essential features hearing “cases where one of the parties is, or 
could be, a state or an international organization,” which presupposes cases must be filed to evaluate 
the authority of a court. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 56, at 3 n.2 (quoting Cesare Romano, 
Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany, Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues and Players, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1, 6 (Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter & 
Yuval Shany eds., 2014). 
 165.  See, e.g., Ally Possi, The East African Court of Justice: Towards Effective Protection of Human 
Rights in the East African Community, in 17 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 173 
(Christiane E. Philipp et al. eds., 2013); James Gathii, supra note 116.  
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member states. In the Serengeti case, an NGO was successful in getting orders 
to stop the government of Tanzania from building a highway across the 
Serengeti National Park.166 The case was funded through a global campaign that 
invoked the park’s status as a UNESCO Heritage site and included major 
international conservation groups that came together to raise money and 
awareness about the case under the name “Save the Serengeti.” This level of 
mobilization around the EACJ started with human rights cases. The fact that 
complainants now use the EACJ to bring environmental cases demonstrates 
that groups outside of the Court’s jurisdiction recognize its authority and are 
capitalizing on the Court to achieve their objectives.167 The recognition of the 
authority of the EACJ’s rulings by human rights NGOs and litigants seeking to 
enforce those rulings through national judicial enforcement or naming-and-
shaming mechanisms highlights the Court’s intermediate authority.168 
This widening circle of actors interested in the EACJ’s developing ability to 
consistently shape and reshape the law and politics of human rights in the 
region may herald the very early beginnings of the Court’s extensive authority. 
Until EACJ rulings consistently shape and reshape the law and politics of 
human rights in East Africa, its intermediate authority is at a thin-elite level for 
at least two reasons. First, litigation before the EACJ requires legal expertise, 
which is available to well-paying, politically connected, donor-funded litigants, 
or litigants supported through pro bono strategic litigation of the EACJ. After 
all, legal services are in the hands of the urban-centric, educated elites. Second, 
the EACJ decides an extremely small number of cases relative to the 
widespread nature of violations of human rights in East Africa.169 Indeed, more 
than merely litigation is needed to democratize authoritarian societies. 
Although the EACJ has intermediate authority at a thin-elite level in 
human rights cases—because more cases involving human rights have been 
brought to the Court since the Katabazi case—this intermediate authority does 
not flow solely from the fact that some cases have resulted from human rights 
advocates’ repeated use of the Court by human rights advocates, nor from the 
changing the practices of East African governments. Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen’s discussion of narrow authority helps to elucidate the more varied 
sources of the EACJ’s authority. They argue that narrow authority is indicated 
by actors’ “meaningful step[s] in response to the ruling, such as paying 
 
 166.  African Network for Animal Welfare v. Att’y Gen. Tanzania (Serengeti), Ref. No. 9 of 2010 
(EACJ First Instance Div. 2014), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Judgement-Ref.-No.9-of-
2010-Final.pdf. 
167.   For more on this, see James Gathii, Saving the Serengeti: Africa’s New International Judicial 
Environmentalism, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016). 
 168.  Interview at the Attorney General’s Office A, in Nairobi, Kenya (July 28, 2013). This official 
made it clear that the view of the Government of Kenya was that the EACJ did not have jurisdiction 
over human rights as this was a question still being negotiated by the member states. Id. 
 169.  See generally Makau Mutua, Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Defining the Challenges, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS IN EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE TENSIONS 13, 31–32 (Makau 
Mutua ed., 2008) (criticizing these groups for their dependency on northern funding and 
methodologies). 
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compensation [or] reviewing or revising challenged laws and policies . . . .”170 
Because a court with intermediate authority presumably has narrow authority 
as well, the EACJ would, using this understanding of narrow authority, have 
triggered actors outside the government to take meaningful steps toward 
compliance and therein achieved intermediate authority. Although there have 
been cases of compliance by governments,171 the EACJ’s cases on human rights 
have been important in another respect that the Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 
authority framework does not capture. Activists use human rights litigation to 
name and shame governments for human rights violations.172 Thus, human rights 
cases in authoritarian contexts are widely recognized as having more utility than 
merely seeking compliance. For example, long-standing research shows that 
some litigants prefer an acknowledgment that a wrong has been done to them 
rather than a monetary award.173 Other scholars have argued persuasively that 
“in order to capture the full range and effects of court decisions, impact studies 
need to enlarge the conventional and methodological fields of vision . . . [by 
paying] attention . . . to the broader impact, which includes equally important 
indirect and symbolic effects.”174 
In short, human rights activists bring cases before the EACJ not necessarily 
or merely to get compliance, but to name and shame their governments for the 
alleged violations. The authority framework offered by Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen does not take into account these alternative uses of litigation 
surrounding human rights that do not involve compliance as a goal or that have 
compliance as merely one of a broader set of strategies in the effort to 
democratize authoritarian societies.175  
 
 170.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 56, at 13.  
 171.  One of the best examples here is the payment of $2 million to the Kenyan lawyers who 
successfully challenged the government’s slate of nominees in the Nyong’o case. See Nyong’o v. Kenya, 
(2011) K.L.R. Misc. Application No. 173 of 2011 (H.C.K) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/case 
law/cases/view/77629. Following that case, the EACJ ordered the $2 million payment, the High Court 
of Kenya confirmed the award, and the Kenyan government, after much protestation, paid the lawyers. 
See id. See also Benson Wambugu, Judges Hand Kenya Sh160m Bill in Dispute Over EAC Poll, 
BUSINESS DAILY AFRICA (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.businessdaily africa.com/Corporate-
News/Judges-hand-Kenya-Sh160m-bill-in-dispute-over-EAC-poll/-/539550/ 980654/-/ey9cch/-
/index.html.  
 172.  William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation 
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631–49 (1981). 
 173.  Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 702 (2007) (noting that “virtually all plaintiffs vehemently 
insist, ‘it’s not about the money!’”).  
 174.  César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1675–76 (2011); see also Emilie M. 
Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 
INT’L ORG. 689 (2008); David Harvey, Flexible Accumulation Through Urbanization: Reflections on 
“Post-Modernism” in the American City, 26 THEATER, THEATRICALITY, AND ARCHITECTURE 251 
(1990),ihttp://www.fcp.uncu.edu.ar/upload/harvey-1990-flexible-accumulation-through-
urbanization.pdf. 
 175.  For two excellent sources on this, see MARK FATHI MASSOUD, LAW’S FRAGILE STATE: 
COLONIAL, AUTHORITARIAN, AND HUMANITARIAN LEGACIES IN SUDAN (2013) and William 
Forbath et al., Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice, in STONES OF 
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This willingness by human rights actors to use the EACJ even when they are 
unsure whether they will prevail or whether their rulings will be implemented 
sharply contrasts, however, with the aversion to adversarial legalism that this 
article has demonstrated in the private sector’s nonuse of the EACJ.176 In 
interviews in East Africa, the EABC strongly implied that it did not want to be 
associated with the use of the EACJ because the Court was considered 
aggressive, assertive, and challenging toward East African governments in its 
human rights case law.177 
This article demonstrates that although human rights groups in East Africa 
see their litigation strategy as a tool for raising awareness heightening 
opportunities that challenge governments for human rights abuses, business 
actors are averse to polarizing governments through adversarial litigation and 
prefer solutions to their problems that do not antagonize governments. By 
identifying and explaining this variation between human rights and business 
actors with reference to the EACJ, this article sheds light on the implications of 
these divergent preferences have on the authority of the Court.  
 
 
HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 51 
(Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011). 
 176.  This by no means suggests that I am advancing the claim that the private sector in East Africa 
does not resort to litigation in national courts; quite to the contrary. Business actors are rational actors 
and have supported reform of national commercial courts to speed up hearing of cases, suggesting that 
they leave open the option of using courts when it is their interest to do so. Similarly, foreign investors 
are either protected by Bilateral Investment Treaties or contractual clauses that designate investor state 
dispute settlement or foreign courts as alternatives to African national or subregional judiciaries.  
 177.  Interview at EABC, in Arusha, Tanzania (July 30, 2013). 
